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 Resum.- Al costat de les molt conegudes revolucions econòmica i política existeix una 
tercera, cabdal per l’aparició de la modernitat: la revolució reproductiva. Aquesta 
consisteix en un canvi, històricament irrepetible, en la eficiència de la reproducció 
humana. El concepte de la revolució reproductiva, a més de clarificar el paper fonamental 
dels progressos demogràfics per a la modernització social, ofereix una forma millor 
d’integrar la sociologia i la demografia front al concepte de transició demogràfica. La 
transició demogràfica ha donat molt poca importància a la reproducció sexual, a la 
mortalitat individual i al reemplaçament generacional de la població. Paradoxalment, ha 
infravalorat la dinàmica longitudinal dels processos vitals, provocant que les tendències 
demogràfiques tendeixin a interpretar-se com el resultat d’altres forces socials. En l’article 
s’exposen algunes evidències empíriques que fonamenten el concepte de revolució 
reproductiva i es discuteixen breument les seves implicacions per a la comprensió del 
canvi demogràfic i les seves implicacions en els debats actuals sobre les transicions 
demogràfiques, la família, la regulació social de la sexualitat, el descens de la fecunditat i 
l’envelliment demogràfic. 
Paraules clau.- Revolució reproductiva, transició demogràfica, regulació social de la 
sexualitat, família, fecunditat, envelliment demogràfic. 
 
 
Resumen.- Junto a las bien conocidas revoluciones económica y política existe una tercera 
revolución crucial para el advenimiento de la mordernidad: la revolución reproductiva. 
Consiste en un cambio históricamente irrepetible en la eficiencia de la reproducción 
humana. Además de clarificar el papel fundamental de los progresos demográficos para la 
modernización social, el concepto de la revolución reproductiva ofrece una mejor manera 
de integrar la sociología y la demografía respecto al concepto de transición demográfica. 
Éste ha tendido a prestar una atención escasa a la reproducción sexual, a la mortalidad 
individual y al reemplazo generacional de la población. Paradójicamente, ha infravalorado 
la dinámica longitudinal de los procesos vitales, provocando que las tendencias 
demográficas tiendan a interpretarse como el resultado de otras fuerzas sociales. Se 
exponen algunas evidencias empíricas que fundamentan el concepto y se discuten 
brevemente sus implicaciones para la comprensión del cambio demográfico y sus 
implicaciones en los actuales debates sobre las transiciones demográficas, la familia, la 
regulación social de la sexualidad, el descenso de la fecundidad y el envejecimiento 
demográfico.  
Palabras clave.- Revolución reproductiva, transición demográfica, regulación social de la 
sexualidad, familia, fecundidad, envejecimiento demográfico. 
 
 
 
  
 
Abstract.- A third ‘revolution’ alongside the better known economic and political ones 
has been crucial to the rise of modernity: the reproductive revolution. This comprises a 
historically unrepeatable shift in the efficiency of human reproduction. As well as 
clarifying the key role of demographic developments in the rise of modernity, the concept 
of reproductive revolution offers a better way to integrate sociology and demography. The 
former has tended to pay insufficient heed to sexual reproduction, individual mortality and 
the generational replacement of population. The latter has, paradoxically, undervalued its 
particular contribution to understanding the longitudinal dynamic of vital processes, so that 
demographic trends tend to be understood mostly as the outcome of other social forces. As 
well as reviewing some empirical evidence for the concept, its implications for debates on 
the demographic transition, family, the social regulation of sexuality, ‘population ageing’ 
and falling fertility are briefly discussed. 
Key words.- Reproductive revolution, demographic transition, social regulation of 
sexuality, family, fertility, demographic ageing. 
 
 
Résumé.- Accompagnant les bien connues révolutions économiques et politiques, s'est 
produite une troisième révolution cruciale pour l'apparition de la modernité, la révolution 
reproductive. Cette dernière es un changement historique unique de l'efficience de la 
reproduction humaine. Mis à part la clarification dans le rôle fondamental des progrès 
démographiques dans la modernisation sociale, le concept de révolution reproductive offre 
une meilleure manière d'intégrer la sociologie et la démographie en référence au concept 
de "transition démographique". Ce dernier a tendu a prêter une attention réduite à la 
reproduction sexuelle, a la mortalité dans sa dimension individuelle et au remplacement 
générationnel de la population. De façon paradoxale, il a infravalorisé la dynamique 
générationnelle des processus vitaux, ce qui a conduit à considérer que les tendances 
démographiques sont une résultante du jeu des autres forces sociales. Dans ce travail on 
décrit la base empirique qui sert de base au concept et on discute de manière brève ses 
implications pour la compréhension du changement démographique, de la famille, de la 
régulation sociale de la sexualité, de la baisse de la fécondité et du vieillissement 
démographique. 
Mots clés.- Révolution reproductive, transition démographique, régulation sociale de la 
sexualité, famille, fécondité, vieillissement démographique. 
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THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION 
 
 
Mankind is like the sea, ever ebbing or flowing, every 
minute one is born another dies. Those that are the people 
this minute, are not the people the next minute. In every 
instant and point of time there is a variation. No one time 
can be indifferent for all mankind to assemble.  
(Filmer 1991 [1680])  
 
 
1.- The reproductive revolution 
Much attention has been paid to the political and industrial revolutions that ushered in 
modernity, transforming the economy, producing the modern state and unleashing 
individualism (Hobsbawm 1962). However a third revolution, as important as its better 
known siblings, has been overlooked: the reproductive revolution in the efficiency of 
production of human beings. The reproductive revolution is a one-off historical process in 
which the quantitative efficiency of the reproductive system undergoes a qualitative leap 
which transforms the traditional relation between reproductive ‘input’ (in its simplest form 
‘number of births’) and reproductive ‘output’ (in its simplest form ‘size of population’). 
Both input and output can be defined in readily measurable and empirically testable terms. 
Moreover, not only has demography identified the empirical mechanism responsible for 
this revolution (the increase in lifespan associated with each birth) but has also provided an 
exact measure: we need merely relate the generational rate of reproduction of years of life 
(Henry 1965) to the number of children per mother needed to maintain a population at a 
stable size. There are two aspects to the reproductive revolution. One is the decline in the 
number of births per woman needed to secure generational replacement. The second is the 
labour input to each birth. Most of the world has undergone this revolution over the last two 
centuries, and especially in the last fifty years. However in different times and places its 
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relationship to its sister revolutions has taken different forms, as has the relation between its 
two aspects. 
The progress of the reproductive revolution over time can best be represented by a logistic 
curve. The reproductive potential of humans is great: some groups have reached averages 
as high as nine or ten live births per woman. Primitive levels of material development 
during most of human prehistory, together with the risky nature of human sexual 
reproduction for mothers and babies, required this potential to be used fairly fully simply to 
maintain population levels. For example, the completed fertility of cohorts of women born 
at the start of the nineteenth century was around five in countries as diverse as Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, Holland, England and Wales, Italy, Germany and Spain (Festy 1979). 
The efficiency of the system over the long term was low and relatively unchanging. Over 
the short term, of course, demographic crises caused by disease, war or famine threatened 
replacement (Coale 1986; Livi Bacci 2001). Breakthroughs to higher levels of efficiency 
may have been achieved, but these were neither be sustained nor generalised. Most women 
spent most of their (brief) adult lives pregnant, lactating or rearing children, with the 
exception of those few fortunate enough to survive beyond their forties, or to have the 
power or status to delegate their reproductive tasks to others.  
For example, in Spain at the start of the last century (1900), just over one fifth of all 
children died in their first year. A similar proportion of the survivors died before their fifth 
birthday. After that mortality rates decrease, but by their thirtieth birthday just under 
another fifth of these survivors died, leaving barely half the original cohort alive at age 30, 
and two fifths by age 45 (Pérez Diaz 2003). Since not every woman surviving to their 
fertile years could become a mother (in Spain at the start of last century one in ten women 
remained unmarried, principally through the lack of marriageable men), those who did so 
had to bear five or six children if generational replacement was to be accomplished. 
Childbirth was a dangerous time for both mother and baby. For example in Scotland in the 
1920s – a country much more advanced economically than Spain at the time – almost one 
per cent of pregnancies ended in the mothers’ death. That rate has now been reduced one 
hundredfold so that the lifetime risk of dieing in childbirth is tiny: one in twenty or thirty 
thousand. However in some African countries where the reproductive revolution has yet to 
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occur the lifetime risk of maternal death is as high as one in eight (World Health 
Organisation 2004).  
It is not difficult to see that under such conditions, those women lucky enough to survive to 
childbearing ages, would see the bulk of their fertile years dominated by reproductive work. 
Women in Spain reaching 15 years of age in 1915 had an average remaining life 
expectancy of 43 years. We could guesstimate that at least a quarter, and often a half or 
more, of those years would be dominated by such work. Within this time such women 
would be likely to see one or more of their children predecease them. Moreover, the 
precariousness of life would leave her little guarantee that either her or her husband would 
themselves survive to see their children reach adulthood. The widespread existence of the 
institution of godparents was an insurance against the real possibility of the early death of 
both parents. Thus, one in six children born in the first decade of this century in Spain lost 
their father before their fifteenth birthday, and one in ten lost their mother. By the time 
these children were in their fertile years themselves their offspring were unlikely to grow 
up with many surviving grandparents (Pérez 2001). 
Once the reproductive revolution begins, however, reproductive efficiency rises rapidly, so 
that in a century or less, the number of births per woman necessary to replace population 
falls to less than half its previous level. This leap in efficiency has two causes: the 
proportion of women surviving to the end of their childbearing years increases while the 
children they bear themselves lead longer lives. The rise in efficiency starts to level off 
once ever larger proportions of women survive to the end of their childbearing years. 
Henceforth gains in efficiency become more dependent only on increases in years of life 
per birth, rather than on the combined effect of this and reductions in female mortality prior 
to menopause. Depending on whether we assume longevity to have a set biological limit or 
not (Wilmoth 1999; 2000), the curve either eventually levels off, or continues a gentler rise. 
The vast majority of those born now live long enough not only to become parents 
themselves, but also to enjoy a substantial and active period of life after that, not only 
seeing their children become independent but seeing them having children (and even 
grandchildren) themselves. For example in the UK in the year 2000, six out of ten babies 
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born had all four grandparents known to be alive when they were born, while a mere two 
per cent had only one or no surviving grandparent1. The reproductive work of these 
grandparents is increasingly important, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by those 
searching for ‘evolutionary’ theory accounts of human longevity (see e.g. Lee 2003).  
Because of its origins in the breakthrough constituted by the mass survival of women to the 
end of their fertile years this gain in reproductive efficiency is by definition a one-off event. 
While some of its proximate causes lie in social and economic progress that facilitates such 
mass survival, the dynamic of the revolution itself is demographic, determined by the 
empirical characteristics of the sexual genesis and mortality of human beings. These 
characteristics make the kind of longitudinal perspective that only a proper integration of 
sociology and demography can provide, and which we propose here, a prerequisite to 
understanding social change. Thus while we do not argue that demography need not seek 
‘inter-disciplinary’ explanations, and do not propose demographic ‘endogamy’ (van Wissen 
& Dykstra 1999) we do argue that demography has not only a distinct but also a necessary 
contribution to make. Specifically demographic processes are a vital part of the 
explanation. 
The reproductive revolution has three direct consequences, all of which facilitate its 
companion revolutions. First, by making reproduction more efficient it liberates resources 
for production. The proportion of what were anyway short and precarious lives devoured by 
the need to recreate life itself becomes a much smaller part of longer, more secure lives. 
Second, by vastly decreasing the importance of the ineluctably biological division of labour 
in reproduction in people’s lives it erodes the material base of patriarchy and paves the way 
for the feminisation of the public sphere and creates the material context for successful 
feminist struggle. Feminist ideas have existed for millennia. Their practical realization is 
little more than a century old. Mann has suggested that liberalism has never been able to 
resist feminism, however it is the material platform of the RR that has made this possible. 
Finally, it transforms sexual behaviour from a public to a private activity. These latter two 
                                                 
1 Author’s analysis UK Millenium Cohort Study Centre for Longitudinal Studies. 2004. "Millennium Cohort 
Study First Survey 2001-2003[computer file] 2nd Edition.February. SN: 4683.University of London. Institute 
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changes have been noted but misunderstood by the debates over both the ‘first’ and 
‘second’ demographic transitions. These have tended to see values as the cause, rather than 
the consequence of reproductive behaviour change. In our analysis, it is the reproductive 
revolution is the essential precondition for such values to descend from the realm of utopia 
to practical possibility.  
What we call the reproductive revolution has been understood as the ‘demographic 
transition’, after Thompson’s 1929 American Journal of Sociology article first identified 
three groups of countries corresponding to the two end points of the transition from ‘high’ 
to ‘low’ fertility and mortality and the third, intermediate, group of low mortality countries 
where fertility rates were ‘coming under control’ (1929: 959). However, the subsequent 
eighty years of debate have failed to produce much consensus either about the causes or 
characteristics of this transition, nor, surprisingly, what two distinct demographic regimes 
the transition was between, or what, aside from empirical description, the terms ‘high’ or 
‘low’ might mean. It was routinely assumed or asserted that ‘the fundamental economic and 
social changes of modernization or development’ (Teitelbaum and Winter 1986: 14) lay 
behind the transition, but it has proved impossible to demonstrate this empirically. Pre-
transition societies proved more diverse than expected, and variables associated with 
modernization stubbornly fail to predict demographic change. However, if we drop the 
assumption that the reproductive revolution is simply the result of ‘external’ economic and 
social progress, and instead take account of its internal demographic logic, we can see it 
clearly as a necessary condition of such progress itself.  
It is useful to distinguish between two aspects of reproductive labour: (1) the relationship of 
births to generational replacement and population level and (2) the labour input per birth. 
The first is a strictly quantitative measure of the efficiency of human reproduction that 
allows us to see most clearly the qualitative leap in human reproductive efficiency over the 
last two centuries. However this transformation also takes the form of changes in the 
second aspect, both in terms of the nature of this labour, and its relationship to other forms 
of labour.  
                                                                                                                                                    
of Education." Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor].. This understates the demographic change in 
that a proportion of grandparents are alive but not definitely known to be so by their children. 
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The relationship between these two aspects is complex and variable, both over time and 
across countries. For example the order of events in Spain appears to have been that first 
the ‘actuarial’ efficiency of the system improved, allowing fertility to fall enough to create 
an increase in the input of reproductive labour associated with each birth which in turn 
fostered further increases in life expectancies and efficiency in the first sense. This allowed 
a strictly temporary flourishing of the male breadwinner system, in which women could 
devote a large proportion of their longer lives exclusively to reproductive labour. More 
married, at younger ages, and had children more quickly. However, considered as a 
reproductive system, and not just as one that erected a sexual division of labour and 
opportunity between paid and unpaid work (Parsons 1956) the essence of the male 
breadwinner system was how rapidly its capacity to revolutionise the efficiency of 
reproductive labour abolished its own pre-conditions of existence: it literally died of 
success, as the weight of the biological division of labour in reproduction fell and women 
were freed (or expelled) to work in other sectors, or in less direct reproductive work (e.g. in 
public education and health systems).  
In this sense we can visualise reproduction as a fourth (or rather first) sector of the 
economy, analogous to agriculture, industry and services. Rising productivity ultimately 
results in the decline in the relative size of the workforce and the expulsion of part of it to 
other sectors. Of course, the biological division of labour in sexual reproduction, and the 
strict limits to the potential ‘industrialisation’ of the family mean that instead this expulsion 
mostly takes the form of people dedicating relatively less time to work in this sector across 
their life course. However, the basic point cannot be emphasised enough. A fundamental 
precondition of the successful transition to modernity is a reproductive revolution 
permitting the liberation of productive effort from the daily struggle to maintain population 
in the face of war, famine and disease. 
Reproductive efficiency has various directly social dimensions and manifold social 
consequences as we discuss further below. The reproductive revolution has taken place 
within quite diverse social arrangements regulating reproductive work (for example the 
way in which the state redistributes resources between parents and non-parents or shares 
the burden of reproductive work by providing education, health or childcare services to 
parents). Finally, as an essentially global process, it has of necessity taken diverse forms in 
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different time periods, at different levels of economic and social development in successive 
countries. In what follows we make frequent reference to the specific case of Spain, as the 
relatively recent and rapid nature of the revolution there renders it unusually visible. 
 
2.- The consequences of the reproductive revolution 
The reproductive revolution has five key consequences, although one is simply a part of the 
revolution itself. As in other cases such as the industrial and information technology 
revolutions, the first consequence is that the proportion of reproductive labour within the 
total volume of productive activity decreases, freeing energy and resources for other 
activities. This shift becomes visible as falling fertility rates as fewer children are needed to 
ensure generational replacement or maintain population at a given level, while each 
individual couple faces a much lower risk of their children predeceasing them. There is no 
direct causal link between reproductive efficiency and fertility, but history shows few 
examples of societies where such efficiency gains, once established, have been devoted to 
multiplying their reproductive power rather than diminishing the proportion of effort 
dedicated to reproduction. As the cases of Spain and Italy demonstrate, if life expectancy is 
rising, population can keep growing, net of migration effects, even when the period total 
fertility rate falls well below the (misconceived) ‘replacement level’ of 2.1.  
It is useful to compare reproductive with other forms of labour. Smith, Marx and other 
classical economists described how the extension of the division of labour and 
accumulation of capital could revolutionise productivity. Until the reproductive revolution 
occurs, reproductive labour was rarely subject to much extension of the original, biological 
determined, division of labour in conception, parturition and lactation. The revolution 
transforms this in two ways. First, many more people come to share in reproductive labour. 
Longer lives permit the extension of the division of reproductive labour across more family 
members and over longer life courses. Still more important is that a vastly increased 
proportion of each generation of women survives into their fertile years to participate in this 
work in the first place. Second, reproductive labour becomes spectacularly more efficient as 
its products come to last much longer and have much higher ‘value’. Infants are born who 
will not only reach their own fertile years in much greater numbers, but will then go on, as 
 8
grandparents, to do yet more reproductive work. Reproductive labour comes to benefit 
enormously from ‘capital accumulation’ in two senses. Technological progress in other 
sectors, leads to improvements in diet, living and housing conditions, medical knowledge 
and public health, reducing mortality. Thus alongside the improvement in the ratio of births 
to generational replacement, lie changes in the amount and productivity of reproductive 
labour associated with each birth. At the same time, the need for infants to establish an 
intense and enduring relationship with a limited number of adults who take responsibility 
for their care has set severe limits to the ‘industrialisation’ of the family presaged by Davis 
(1937) and others.  
Because children are more ‘cumbersome’ (Myrdal 1968) in a mobile, market society, 
demographic transition theories have generally concluded that the costs of child rearing 
increase with economic development, and attempt to explain falling fertility in this way 
(e.g. by theorising a reversal in the intergenerational flow of wealth). On the contrary, the 
theory of reproductive revolution hypothesises that the costs of production of children, at 
least in terms of necessary labour time devoted by parents, falls dramatically, even as the 
value of children (in terms of the average social capital they possess, education received, or 
earnings potential) rises continuously. What does fall is the willingness of parents to bear 
these costs, while the share that is socialised and borne by the state increases.  
The opportunity cost of children does rise, as Davis and Myrdal noted. But this fact only 
makes sense if understood within the context that general economic development, by 
multiplying opportunities, must by definition increase the ‘opportunity cost’ of every 
conceivable time consuming activity (Becker 1965, Linder 1970). Having children may 
require foregoing ever expanding leisure opportunities, but no more so than enjoying 
leisure opportunities requires foregoing ever expanding opportunities to have children! 
People in post-reproductive revolution societies have fewer children not because they can 
no longer afford them, but, on the contrary, because for perhaps the first time in human 
history they, and the societies they inhabit, can afford not to. 
The second consequence of the reproductive revolution is thus the redistribution of 
reproductive work both within and between generations. Within each generation more 
women survive long enough to reach fertile ages and thus share in reproductive labour. As 
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we shall argue below, the reproductive revolution also undermines patriarchy, so that the 
reproductive burden also comes to be shared more equally with men. Meanwhile longer life 
spans mean that there are not only more surviving mothers and fathers, but also 
grandmothers and grandfathers to share in this work. Within the family, generation 
gradually starts to supplant gender as the principle determinant of the distribution of 
reproductive work across the life course.  
A third consequence, is thus that the smaller volume of reproductive work not only comes 
to form a decreasing proportion of people’s lengthening lives, but becomes less 
concentrated in time across these lives. At first, paradoxically, it is likely that the opposite 
occurs. In Spain, for example the length of time between marriage and birth of first child 
fell, and pregnancies were concentrated in a short period. Later, however, as the weight of 
reproductive labour fell further and starts to be redistributed, first births came to be ever 
more delayed, and spaces between subsequent births (if indeed there were any) increased 
(Devolder 2005; Requena 1997). Meanwhile the labour associated with these births came to 
be shared out among more family members (fathers, grandparents) and either provided by 
the state or purchased in the market. Parents may expect help in performing it from their 
own parents, (whom prior to the reproductive revolution would have usually died before 
witnessing the birth of their grandchildren) and even their grandparents, while in return, 
they may expect to undertake such labour themselves both as parents and later as grand- or 
great-grandparents. The UK millennium cohort study, for example found that although only 
one in twenty babies shared a household with a grandparent, one half of those with working 
mothers were looked after by grandparents while their mothers were at work, and three out 
of four were cared for by grandparents at other times. Nor was childcare the only means of 
grandparental support. One third of mothers and a similar proportion of fathers reported 
receiving essential or financial help from their own parents (loans, money or physical 
capital gifts, domestic equipment, help with housing etc.) in addition to gifts or extras for 
the baby.2 
                                                 
2 Author’s analysis UK Millennium Cohort Study Ibid.. 
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This redistribution of reproductive work across the life course has sometimes been seen, 
together with the extra gains in longevity by women, as the ‘feminisation’ of old age (eg 
Pérez Díaz 2003). However this is, misleadingly, to apply a link between reproductive work 
and gender that is itself weakening because of this very change! Reproductive labour is 
being re-distributed between the sexes. What is occurring is not the feminization of old age 
but the partial de-feminisation of reproductive work and its redistribution across the life 
course, as part of the shift from gender to generation, made possible by the increasing co-
existence of three and often four generations in the same filial line. When they retire, or 
reduce their paid work hours, men’s roles may lose their previous ‘productivist’ status, 
allowing them to migrate towards ‘reproductivist’ roles. Longer lives, themselves a product 
of the reproductive revolution, together with falling activity rates for those over fifty, now 
facilitate grandparents’ reproductive labour. 
Within this altered scenario, the influence of the core biological division of labour is 
reduced, both because fertility levels can fall, and because the link between the biological 
and social sexual division of reproductive labour is weakened, so that a fourth, and 
historically unprecedented, result of the reproductive revolution is the decline of patriarchy, 
the rise of feminism and the creation of a core feminizing logic within modernity that 
ultimately leads to contemporary seismic shifts in what is commonly termed gender 
relations (Connell 2002) but which we prefer to think of as social relations between the 
sexes (MacInnes 1998). The inefficiency of the pre-revolution reproductive system 
condemned most women to spend most of their adult lives pregnant or breastfeeding 
neonatal infants. Until the reproductive revolution, this was true of almost all known 
societies on earth. This has received little attention in sociology, yet it surely explains the 
hitherto ubiquitous dominance of patriarchy, even though there is room for debate over how 
best to analyse the precise nature of the causal link and the tremendously variable social 
form it has taken (MacInnes 1998). It is hardly surprising that social relations took a 
patriarchal form when women were such a scarce ‘means of reproduction’ of the population 
(Gil Calvo 1991; Meillassoux 1981; Rubin 1977). Perhaps the greatest achievement of the 
reproductive revolution is to liberate women by dint of reducing the relative scarcity of 
their reproductive labour. 
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Heterosexual intercourse is still normally central to sexual reproduction (but no longer 
inevitable, given in vitro fertilization and sperm and egg donation). Pregnancy is necessary, 
but, as in the past, compatible with other productive work until its later stages. Lactation 
may be seen as desirable for nutritional, health or psychological reasons, but is readily 
substitutable by other feeding methods, or rendered more flexible by technology facilitating 
the expression and conservation of breast milk. As well as increasing the efficiency of some 
aspects of reproductive labour (disposable nappies, bottled milk, pre-prepared foods, baby 
alarms and so on) technological innovation loosens the link between reproductive labour 
and sex so that it is no longer so directly tied to women as a sex. Ideology may still portray 
women as ‘naturally’ more suited than men to infant care, and moral panics over male child 
abuse may even police such a division of labour more tightly, but it is no longer 
biologically imposed and is rapidly being socially redrawn. Thus as well as mounting 
evidence of a slow but substantial increase in the proportion of reproductive work done by 
men (Gershuny 1992), there is a overwhelming contemporary support, on the part of both 
men and women, for greater change. In separate surveys conducted between 2002 and 2004 
in Europe and North America, over nine out of ten women and men agreed not only that 
‘men should do more childcare’ but also that they ‘should take as much responsibility as 
women for home and children’ 3. 
The idea of equality between men and women has existed for millennia. Liberalism, or 
discourses of human ‘natural’ rights, have been defenceless against feminism (Mann 1994). 
Once it is admitted that natural differences between men are irrelevant to their moral 
equality, it is difficult to argue that such differences (of sex) between men and women are 
relevant. However the potential for the practical realization of greater sexual equality has 
only been released by the reproductive revolution, together with the evolution of the 
potentially sex-blind markets, bureaucracies and polities, and shift of production from the 
                                                 
3 Authors analysis ISSP Family and Gender Roles III survey International Social Survey Programme. 2004. 
"Family and Changing Gender Roles III, 2002. [computer file] 1st edition, ZA3880;UK Data Archive 
SN5018." Köln: Zentralarchiv Für Empirische Sozialforschung. Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive[distributor]. Authors análisis, European Social Survey Round 2. Jowell, R and the Central Co-
ordinating Team (2005), European Social Survey 2004: Technical Report, London: Centre for Comparative 
Social Surveys, City University. European Social Survey Round 2 2005 [computer file] First edition. 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services [supplier]. 
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household towards the public sphere that this revolution has itself helped to create. This is 
what has made the triumph of feminism possible over the last century. It has reduced the 
edifice of patriarchy in Western societies to ruins with hardly the slightest organised or 
formal resistance from men (the guerrilla warfare of domestic and sexual violence or 
harassment is, of course, another issue). A feminising logic lies at the heart of the 
reproductive revolution. Paradoxically, while second wave feminist thought focused on 
‘plastic’ sexuality and its symbolism, the real roots of gender change lay in the shrinking 
significance of reproductive sexuality. 
Finally, less a consequence than a component of the reproductive revolution itself, is the 
dawn, for the first time in human history, of ‘mass maturity’. Over the last century, and 
more particularly over the last fifty years, people living in more affluent states have not 
only come to live much longer lives on average than their predecessors (gains in mean life 
expectancy), but survival to ‘old’ age has become widespread or ‘democratised’ (the 
proportions of each cohort surviving to given advanced ages have risen). Figure 1 charts 
this progress for women in Spain, while Figure 2 gives data for the first generations in 
Spain, Canada and Sweden where the proportion of those born who survived till their 
fiftieth year reached fifty per cent.  
Hobbes famously remarked that in his ‘state of nature’ life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651)). While much attention has been paid to the social 
relations of nastiness and brutishness, the importance of emancipation from cruelly short 
lives, both one’s own and those of others, has not been sufficiently appreciated. Knowledge 
of this emancipation has also become commonplace. Only in a world where people assume 
that reaching one’s seventieth or eightieth year in robust health is normal can it make sense 
to discuss the provenance of threats to such an achievement in terms of ‘risk’. Thus, for us, 
the contrasts made between ‘risk’ and ‘fate’ by theorists, such as Beck, Giddens or Lash, 
turns things on their head. They present what is experienced by most people as liberation 
from the fatal consequences of ignorance, disorder and want, as the socially constructed 
domination of people’s lives by necessarily opaque scientific expertise and specialization 
(Beck, Giddens and Lash; Giddens 1991). 
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Figure 1.- Spain: Survival curves for women by generation 1856-1960 
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This development of mass maturity is no less fundamental than it is novel. Until not much 
more than a century ago, people in almost every corner of the globe could count themselves 
fortunate to survive much beyond their fortieth year. One in four or five usually died before 
their first birthday (see e.g. data in Pérez Diaz 2003). Not only are lives now getting 
steadily longer, and people’s quality of life at any given age better, but mortality is 
 14
increasingly concentrated in older ages, so that a long life is ever more a common 
expectation rather than seen as a stroke of fortune or God’s special benediction.  
 
 
Figure 2.- Survival curves by age for the first generations to reach ‘mass maturity’ in Sweden, 
Canada and Spain 
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This democratisation of longevity becomes the kernel of the reproductive revolution once it 
reaches that point at which most women survive to the end of their fertile years. This 
sustained qualitative leap in the efficiency of the demographic system is not only 
historically unprecedented, but also unrepeatable. At the same time it comprises part of the 
essential structure of the launch platform for modernisation, freeing resources for 
development elsewhere. We discuss below the bizarre way in which this demographic 
achievement has come to be represented, on the contrary, as the impending threat of 
‘population ageing’. 
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3.- The visibility of the reproductive revolution 
It might be asked why, if it is so fundamental, the reproductive revolution has gone 
unrecognised. There are many answers, but let us highlight two. Sociology (and often 
demography) prefers transversal (cross-sectional) measures and analyses, particularly 
where immediate policy relevance is sought. The reproductive revolution, mass maturity 
and social processes involved in the reproduction of society over time are only clearly 
visible using longitudinal measures. On the contrary, transversal measures make 
‘population ageing’ far more visible compared to longitudinal measures. This problem is 
aggravated by the tendency to imagine societies (plural) as essentially discrete, two-
dimensional structures4 whose essential characteristics may be captured by the social 
survey or census, and which change over time as they move up or down history as coherent 
units (Anderson 1991: 33). On the contrary we wish to emphasise the significance of mortal 
biographies and generational and life course change within a human society that spills 
across both state frontiers and time periods (MacInnes 2006).  
The second part of the explanation is that the reproductive revolution tends to cover its own 
tracks. Not only was it an unplanned and unconscious process at the social level (although 
the individual level may be a very different matter); the material affluence it helped create 
has minimised its visibility by presenting reproductive behaviour that was formerly a 
virtually unavoidable collective obligation as a matter of apparently onerous personal 
choice. We return to this below in the context of discussing aspects of ‘technologically non-
progressive’ labour (Baumol 1967).  
 
4.- The origin of the concept of reproductive revolution 
The gestation of the concept of a reproductive revolution proposed here began with the 
search within demography for better indicators of reproduction than simple fertility, and 
has been spurred on by recent empirical research on generational demographic change. The 
role of the ‘French school’ in demography, which along with family studies (de Singly 
                                                 
4 Visualised, for example, in terms of a dataset or as members of a ‘population’ distributed along the x-axis 
and their various characteristics plotted on a series of Y-axes. 
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1993), always placed more emphasis on ‘genealogy’ was central to this development; in 
particular the work of Henry (1965) and his concept of the reproduction of years of life. 
Unusually, Spain then played a key role in the development, through the work of two 
demographers who did their theses under the direction of the French school: Fernández 
Cordón (who went on to be director of the Instituto de Demografía) (1995; 1977; 1986) and 
Cabré i Pla (1979; 1999) who went on to become director of the Centre d’Estudis 
Demogràfics in Catalonia; and through the work of Luis Garrido (1992). It is in his article, 
‘La revolución reproductiva’ (1996) that the expression itself was first employed.  
Spain possesses various historic and demographic conditions that help account for this 
longitudinal analytic emphasis: the speed and historical compression of modernisation 
produced a particular constellation of generations with contrasting historical experiences 
living side by side, rather like a mass of geological strata concentrated in a small space. In 
around half a century Spain went from being an agrarian, rural society with the worst 
mortality in Europe to an urban, services based economy with one of the world’s highest 
life expectancies. In countries where the reproductive revolution started earlier the 
generational mix of the population was less heterogeneous in terms of their historical 
experience, while in countries that still have to complete this revolution some generational 
profiles have yet to become sufficiently generalised to become salient. Thus in Spain it is 
not only easy to see that a cross sectional table of data by age in no way corresponds to any 
typical life course, but also that the content of the table will change dramatically in the next 
few years simply by virtue of the progressive substitution of each generation by its 
successor.  
We are clearly making a bold - and for some, pretentious - claim when we argue that 
reproductive change has not only been revolutionary, but of such overarching significance 
as to compare with the other two, generally acknowledged, revolutions fundamental to the 
rise of modern society (Hobsbawm 1962). However, demographic change cannot simply be 
seen as an ‘effect’ or consequence of other social changes, changes that we might also use 
to understand the political and economic revolutions. Only by appreciating the 
interconnected nature of change within the demographic and other arenas can key aspects 
of modernity be understood. In this sense, we see approaches to the demographic transition 
which attempt to account for it in terms of material or cultural determinants or ‘causes’ as 
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partial. Moreover, in developing what we see as a sociology of reproduction, we do not 
mean a sociology of the social context within which reproduction (understood in terms of 
other dynamics) takes place. On the contrary it is part of our argument that the failure to 
take sufficient account of the sexual genesis of human beings and therefore of the social 
significance of the unique demographic change represented by the reproductive revolution 
has been a key theoretical weakness of contemporary sociology, unlike its pre-Second 
World War antecedents (MacInnes 1998; Wrong 1961)5. One illustration of this is the 
almost total divorce between the two disciplines, until concern about falling fertility, 
expressed first in policy circles and imported to the discipline from there, has recently 
rekindled some sociological interest. Another is the virtually universal assumption in 
sociology that social reproduction is a question of the reproduction of social structures, 
norms, roles, class positions or patterns of behaviour, rather than the maintenance of a 
supply of human beings to staff them. This latter has simply been taken as a ‘given’, whose 
origins and determinants merit little further investigation. 
 
5.- The social relevance of sexual reproduction, or human sexual genesis  
In contrast to the strikingly demure way contemporary sociology averts its gaze from the 
carnal origins of individuals, the latter has five key implications which are given 
insufficient attention in current research and analysis: 
 
1.- The existence of two sexes necessary for reproduction forms the basis for 
the existence of a sexual division of labour which may be extended beyond 
reproduction to other spheres of social life and thus form the basis for the 
elaboration of gender distinctions and discrimination by sex. Social 
constructionist approaches that attempt to explain the analytic construction of 
biological sex categories of in terms of the social relations of gender (e.g. 
Kessler and McKenna 1978) simply standing things on their head. 
                                                 
5 By sexual genesis we mean that humans reproduce sexually as a species, so that every human being requires 
a biological father and mother, and the vast majority are born as clearly biologically male or female. 
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2.- Sexual reproduction, individual mortality and finite and variable life spans 
presuppose each other. Unlike society which, especially after the invention of 
writing, becomes spatially infinite and potentially everlasting, humans are 
mortal and tied to an individual body located empirically in time and space 
(Craib 1994). In this lies the origin of the need for any population that is to 
survive over time to devote some of its activity to reproductive labour in the 
sense of sexually reproducing infant human beings to replace the deceased 
(Coale and Demeny 1983). Social reproduction thus requires not just the 
reproduction of social roles, structures, networks, ideologies or identities, but 
the biological reproduction of people to populate or carry them. The essence 
of the reproductive revolution is that this latter activity has become 
spectacularly more efficient over the last two centuries, and especially over 
the last fifty years, freeing human energies for other activities, including, of 
course, the elaboration of new patterns of reproductive activity itself.  
 
3.- Pelvises narrow enough for upright walking and brains large enough for 
human consciousness have meant that human sexual reproduction not only 
requires childbirth that is risky for the mother, but is also followed by a 
prolonged period of intense neonatal care by adults until such time as the 
human infant become reasonably capable of maintaining social relations 
autonomously (Dinnerstein 1987). It is also clear that such care depends 
heavily upon the long term and stable presence of a very small number of 
individuals, usually the biological parents or close relatives of the infant but 
not necessarily so. Such care, understood best in terms of ‘attachment’ 
(Bowlby 1971; Winnicott 1965) explains the universal existence of the family 
(e.g.Elshtain 1982; Goode 1964), in widely heterogeneous social forms of 
course, and also serves the analytical function of dividing off a private from a 
public sphere (MacInnes 1998). Reproduction can only with great difficulty 
be ‘industrialised’, ‘commoditised’, bureaucratised or otherwise rationalised 
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and undertaken in other social institutions (pace Davis 1937). When this does 
happen, the results are extremely negative (e.g. the experience of those raised 
in orphanages or children’s homes). Of course this does not mean that families 
always perform reproductive work well, or that they are not, sometimes, the 
site of neglect, abuse, violence or murder of children (Alberdi and Matas 
2002; Dobash and Dobash 1992; Kelly and Radford 1987).  
 
4.- Because sexual reproduction thus requires an institution like the family, 
but renders individual human beings mortal, the family has the potential to 
become the key institution regulating inheritance. Hence virtually all societies 
have until now sought to define and regulate legitimacy (Malinowski 1927; 
Morgan 1995). This could even take the form, for example in nineteenth 
century Britain or in Spain up until the second half of the last century, of 
defining illegitimate sexual relations (that might result in the birth of a child 
and potential inheritor) as a crime equivalent to theft of property because it 
put the inheritance of legitimate heirs at risk (Pateman 1988). The waning of 
legitimacy as a key axis of social status simply represents both the decline of 
the political power of the family in relation to the state, and the increase in the 
supply of reproductive labour. 
 
5.- The above consequences of sexual reproduction explain why sexuality has 
always been subject to intense forms of social control at both the level of 
society (both normatively and by the state or whatever other institutions of 
social order exist, for example councils of elders, churches) and at the level of 
the family itself. Until very recently virtually all known societies segregated 
the sexes in various ways, distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate 
offspring and regulated sexual relations, both through marriage and the 
prohibition or penalization of extra-marital sexual relations or non-
reproductive forms of sexual activity. The reproductive revolution explains 
why such controls have rapidly disintegrated in affluent Western societies, 
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allowing the distinction to emerge between reproductive and plastic sexuality 
and other changes that some observers have argued constitute the 
‘transformation of intimacy’ (Giddens 1992; Jamieson 1998). However, to 
explain trends in fertility in terms of the relaxation of such controls, or 
changing norms and values, as in many versions of the ‘second demographic 
transition’, is to turn things on their head once more. It is the reproductive 
revolution that makes such developments possible. 
 
6.- Some implications of the reproductive revolution 
Understanding the nature of the reproductive revolution has implications both for 
sociological and demographic theory (especially the hegemony of transversal measures and 
analyses in both disciplines) and for the application of these theories to many contemporary 
policy debates. Clearly these are complex and wide-ranging issues. As a result we may be 
forgiven for adopting a somewhat didactic approach, in the remainder of this article and 
also for concentrating our remarks on a limited number of areas: the visibility of 
reproductive labour and fertility; the family; the state; and ‘population ageing’. 
 
6.1.- Economic progress, the visibility of labour, individual autonomy and time 
The great leap forward in efficiency of reproductive labour associated with the rise of 
modernity has to some extent been hidden from view by a simultaneous but quite separate 
development: the trend rise in a market based society of the relative cost of ‘technologically 
non-progressive’ and physically inalienable labour. By the former, following Baumol 
(1967) we mean labour that is not amenable to productivity improvement via substantial 
technological innovation; by the latter we mean activity whose results are inseparable from 
the presence of the person performing it. Most reproductive labour has these two features. 
This yields a paradoxical result that is key to any adequate understanding of current fertility 
trends in affluent societies. Just at that point in human history where the efficiency of 
sexual reproduction has been revolutionised, and the social controls on sexuality have all 
but disappeared, it comes to appear as something that is becoming so much more costly 
that it is only possible to maintain at all if an ever greater share of its burden is assumed by 
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the state. Falling fertility rates reflect two developments: a fall in the level of fertility 
needed for replacement, and changes in the distribution of people’s activity between 
reproductive and other labour: a distribution which is increasingly under their own control. 
The essence of this paradox is that the victory of the reproductive revolution becomes so 
absolute that it falls prey to social amnesia. Only societies whose reproduction is assured 
can afford the luxury of thinking in terms of the ‘opportunity costs’ of children, or indeed 
any substantial personal input to reproductive decision-making at all.  
There are two, distinct issues here. One is the social visibility of costs, an issue Baumol 
(1967) addressed in distinguishing technologically non-progressive activities. Within a 
market mechanism, the fantastic cheapening of commodities subject to technological 
innovation appears, paradoxically, as the relentless rise in cost of those commodities and 
activities which are not subject to this process. The essential point for our purposes is that 
the general cheapening of other commodities makes activities requiring a human presence 
and which do not directly employ technology6 relatively costlier compared to the purchase 
(although not always the consumption) of inanimate technology.  
The second issue is the changing nature and content of reproductive labour itself. It is clear 
that pregnancy, childbirth, lactation and the construction of a secure and intimate parental 
relationship with an infant are not only activities which are overwhelmingly technologically 
non-progressive, but are also, almost uniquely in modern societies, status specific. That is 
to say, it matters who does them. A sales assistant, a manager, even a nursery teacher, are 
readily substitutable on the labour market. The parents or guardians of an infant are not. 
Moreover, as the productive forces develop, and the level and specialization of skills 
needed both in production and in other spheres of social life increase, or in Marx´s 
language, the value of labour power rises, (e.g. the development of general literacy, writing, 
communication and language skills, domination of common mechanical and later 
information and other electronic technology) not only does the volume of reproductive 
labour increase, but it becomes impossible for the family itself to sustain it: hence the 
development of universal education once industrialization has taken hold. Two 
                                                 
6 Technological change in other sectors makes reproductive labour more efficient and facilitates its 
simultaneous performance with other activities, but no machine can make a child reach adulthood faster.  
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contradictory forces operate here. Universal education and health services vastly extend the 
division of reproductive labour, but the value of the product increases, and thus the volume 
of reproductive labour absorbed in it.  
Later still, as life chances, autonomy and mass maturity increase to the point where the 
mass of the population can imagine that they might plan their lives reflexively, assuming 
the construction of an ‘identity’, then the reproduction of infants capable of such an 
adventure might be seen to require still greater investment. Such developments lie behind 
Becker’s (Becker 1991) contrast between the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of children, although 
we disagree with the theoretical framework within which he places this, and the 
conclusions he draws. They also lie behind the trend rise in (increasingly ‘expensive’) time 
devoted to rearing children in affluent societies. Thus in Britain, over the last four decades 
or so, time diary evidence suggests that time devoted to childcare may have trebled 
(Gershuny and Fisher 2000). 
The key to this enigma is to realise that it is only the tremendous development of the 
productive forces and general standard of living as a whole, facilitated by the reproductive 
revolution, that has so advanced the opportunities and life chances available to people, 
while simultaneously liberating them from direct obligations to perform reproductive work 
at all, should they so choose, that the latter appears as a ‘costly’ choice, or indeed as any 
choice at all. Again while moral conservatives lament that as a result the family has become 
a mere ‘lifestyle choice’ (Morgan 1995) or declining fertility rates attributed to selfish 
hedonism (McDonald 2000) or shirking the collective obligation to reproduce the very 
basis of society  (Myrdal 1968) this is really vital (in every sense) progress. Moreover, an 
adequately longitudinal view of the family as an institution allows us to see that, far from 
undermining the material basis of the family, the reproductive revolution has ushered in its 
golden age by ensuring the survival at any point in time of and unprecedented number of 
generations within each family. For the first time in history, families comprise mostly the 
flesh and blood living rather than the fondly remembered and mourned.  
Linder (1970) following Becker (1965) used conventional economic theory (along with its 
particular simplifying assumptions) to demonstrate that a logically inevitable consequence 
of economic growth was an increase in the shortage of time and a rise in its price. This 
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takes us back to the contrast outlined earlier between the virtually unbounded character of 
society and the all too finite nature of individual human life spans. As the social range of 
available opportunities increases, choosing how best to enjoy them becomes more difficult, 
because an individual body can only be in one place at one time. However, the simplified 
model of ‘society’ used in such theories abstracts from both the variety of human life spans, 
their changing average length, and individuals knowledge of both their own age and these 
general facts.  
While it is true that, as Keynes (1923) once remarked and is relentlessly quoted, ‘in the 
long run we are all dead’ this is true in two importantly different senses. First it draws 
attention to the inevitability of mortality in general in contrast to its unpredictability in 
particular. In the short run we are very much alive, but have little way of knowing, with 
precision, just where the boundary lies between ‘short’ and ‘long’. Mass maturity might 
define this boundary at the social, but never at the individual, level. Second, however, this 
aphorism highlights the fact that society or culture endure beyond the span of individual 
lives, introducing a fatal divergence between biography and history that not only marks a 
dividing line between individual and collective interests, but between the kind of thing that 
‘society’ and the ‘individual’ are. We return to this issue below when we discuss the 
transversal and the longitudinal. It is also true that in the short to medium term, not only are 
far fewer of us dead, but we are aware of this fact, and can, to some extent, plan for it. 
While the ‘transversal’ opportunity cost of any activity or course of action at any point in 
time becomes higher, this must be set against an increasing ability to plan across a much 
longer life course. This situation is often described in terms of the rise of reflexivity and 
self-identity (Giddens 1991). It might also usefully be seen in terms of a trend increase in 
what Dahrendorf (1979) called ‘life chances’ created not only by the relentless expansion 
of the social division of labour, but also by longer lives across which to explore them.  
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6.2.- The future of the family 
The reproductive revolution, progressively frees sexual reproduction from normative or 
state regulation such as the prohibition of contraception or abortion. Legitimacy becomes 
less relevant. Along with the rise of personal autonomy, the expression of sexuality is 
gradually disconnected from reproduction, permitting the rise of ‘plastic’ sexuality 
(Giddens 1992) together with its vast commodification. Norms and values, such as those 
discussed within the debate over the ‘second demographic transition’ (Cliquet 1991; 
Coleman 2003; Lesthaeghe 1991; Van de Kaa 1990), change so as to re-define sexuality as 
a private matter over which the individual ought to be sovereign. The current legalization of 
homosexual marriage and moves to prevent discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, together with the dismantling of legislation that regulated sexual activity 
(adultery, sodomy etc) and the transformation of sexual activity into something firmly in 
the realm of the ‘private sphere’ represent some of the final stages of this process.7 
Marriage regulated by church or state declines, supplanted by cohabitation and what Davis 
once called ‘unconventionalised intimacies’ (Davis 1937). The substitution of the family by 
the state as the institution which serves as the ultimate guarantor of subsistence, and the 
replacement of the household by the labour market as the main institution governing 
production weakens the family from outside, while inside it is undermined by the increase 
in the force of liberalism and personal autonomy (de Singly 1993; Flaquer 1998). People’s 
status as citizen becomes progressively to supplant their status as family member (Mann 
1994). At the same time as the family is socialised and hollowed out, it moves, 
paradoxically, towards the centre of politics, both as an object of state population policies, 
and as an institution charged with realising the rapidly expanding social rights of the infant, 
as well as their social obligations. This raises the question of the ‘survival’ of the family as 
the location of reproductive sexuality.  
However it would be quite wrong to conclude from this, and from the atrophy of ‘gender’ 
that the family is destined to wither away. Rather it will assume a greater diversity of 
                                                 
7 Once again, Spain serves as an example of exceptionally rapid change. A state that till 1978 required 
husbands to sign married women’s employment contracts now permits marriage between same sex couples on 
equal terms.  
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forms, all of which contain as their distinguishing feature the attempt (usually successfully 
realized) to maintain stable relations of attachment over time between at least one adult and 
an infant, and the later legacy of these relations in terms of feelings of love, mutual loyalty 
and obligation, or indeed, resentment hostility and alienation. Within all this vertical, 
generational relations between (grand)parents and (grand)children will continue to become 
more important than ‘horizontal’ relations between siblings, primarily because of the 
redistribution of reproductive labour, and its money costs, between parents and 
grandparents, and also because of the decline, along with fertility rates, of the absolute 
number of siblings and other relations within similar age cohorts. Mass maturity, 
paradoxically, strengthens and extends the family, in the simple but basic sense that more 
generations of any family are likely to be alive at any point in time, as we have already 
seen. 
 
6.3.- The state and the collectivization of reproduction 
As we noted above, the male breadwinner system can sometimes be seen as an early 
attempt by states to regulate reproductive labour. As living standards rose, it became 
possible, for the first time in human history, to push the sexual division of labour in 
reproductive work to its limit such that women were largely confined to such work rather 
than other forms of production (Parsons 1956). This was especially the case where this 
development came before the generalization of domestic labour saving technology (running 
water, washing machines, gas or electric cookers, gas or electric heating etc) as in the Spain 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so that even within the reproductive revolution the 
volume of reproductive work increased. Elsewhere, such as the US, or Britain, where such 
technological innovation came earlier, women entered the labour market in increasing 
numbers from the 1900s (in the US) and the 1950s (in Britain) However this system 
quickly became a victim of its own success. As the efficiency of reproductive labour 
increased still further, women not only became freed to enter other areas of productive 
labour again, but were increasingly pushed there by the decline in the volume of domestic 
reproductive labour to perform. Moreover within a labour market rather than a patriarchal 
household economy, they could do so on increasingly equal terms with men. The male 
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breadwinner system flared like a candle before it died: a last flourishing of patriarchy 
before it entered its terminal decline. The industrial and economic crises that followed the 
oil shock of the 1970s has hastened the demise of the male breadwinner system 
(Oppenheimer 1994) and it is significant that often it is specifically younger men who have 
been denied access to a ‘family wage’ (Tigges 1991).  
Because the revolution in efficiency of reproductive labour (as an ‘input’ to births) has been 
outpaced by technological progress elsewhere; because it requires much more time and 
effort to producing autonomous adults capable of contributing to a complex, highly 
rationalised, scientific knowledge-based society with an ever widening division of labour; 
and because parents wish to endow their children with the capacity to pursue their own, 
autonomous ‘identity projects’; for all these reasons the transversal ‘cost’ of children 
(relative to other current opportunities) has appeared to rise, pulling the state further into 
the socialization of reproduction in the (misplaced) effort to arrest falling fertility rates. The 
eclipse of the male breadwinner system as a reproductive regime has produced the 
contemporary debate on ‘work-life balance’ or ‘conciliation of work and family life’, as 
states look to increase the labour supply both in the short term (more mothers in 
employment) and the long term (sustaining fertility by encouraging more workers to 
become parents). From the perspective of the reproductive revolution much of this debate 
appears misplaced, as it tends to overlook the wider context of falling fertility on the one 
hand, and underestimate the effort required to make parenting obligations fully compatible 
with employment across a the life course. (MacInnes 2005).  
This is doubly ironic. States do not, in general, socialize the costs of childcare willingly. 
Compared to all taxpayers, workers or voters those who are currently parents of dependent 
children (and those children themselves) form a rather small (and decreasing) group, 
especially compared to those who are, or are confident of becoming, old enough to draw a 
pension (Myrdal 1968 [1939]). However states’ fears of population decline lead them to 
look for measures to boost fertility. If states thus address a real issue for the wrong reasons, 
their likely solution, (pro-natalist policies based on socializing further the costs of children 
through the extension of childcare services, fiscal transfers and subsidies to parents of 
dependent children) will, on past experience, have positive unintended effects on female 
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and child poverty, but only insofar as they fail in their stated intention of increasing fertility 
rates (Folbre 1997).  
 
6.4.- The myth of population ageing and catastrophic population decline 
The debate on population ageing (OECD 1990; World Bank 1994) largely turns upon the 
assertion that longer lifespans must mean an increase in the dependency ratio between those 
in productive employment and those who are not. However this oxymoronic term rests on a 
misleading metaphor characterising societies as individuals. Individuals do ‘age’, bringing 
a decline in their vital capacities and death. Societies, or ‘populations’ cannot and do not 
‘age’. The shape of their age pyramids may change, but ageing is a social as well as 
biological process, and one of the key results of the increase in the social forces of 
production has been an increase not just in average life expectancy, but in the standard of 
health and activity of people for any given calendar age. Sir Mick Jagger, for example, 
remains a sex symbol and rock star at an age which, a century ago, would have rendered 
him infirm had he been fortunate enough to survive at all. Once again, a longitudinal view 
corrects a mistaken transversal impression. We cannot determine the future capacities of 
the elderly by making transversal comparisons across different generations with different 
ages in the population at a point in time. Older people today are vastly different to their 
counterparts in earlier times from earlier generations. So too will be the elderly of the 
future. 
What matters in dependency ratios is the balance, over time and across generations, 
between the productivity of those who work and the consumption levels of those who do 
not, as well as the relative size of these two groups. The productivity of the former will 
continue to increase. The consumption levels of the latter depend inter alia on the relative 
costs of maintaining retired and inactive people versus that of maintaining and educating 
those who have yet to enter the labour force. Insofar as the debate about population ageing 
is about concern over worsening ‘dependency ratios’ as the number of elderly inactive 
increases it is simply empirically mistaken. As we have seen the elderly take on an 
increasing amount of reproductive work, which facilitates much higher rates of 
incorporation of prime age women in the labour market, as well as maintaining high rates 
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of male participation despite trends towards equalization in the domestic and childcare 
sexual division of labour (thus improving rather than worsening dependency ratios). A 
paradoxical effect of the shift from gender to generation in the distribution of work is 
therefore that actual dependency ratios (in the sense of the relationship between those doing 
productive work and those dependent on them) come to have less and less to do with age, 
or the shape of age pyramids in a given society. A second paradox is that it is likely to be 
the improvements in the health, educational level, income and wealth of the elderly that 
lead to increases in their consumption of health and other services, as active assertive, and 
above all experienced, citizens. Finally, general productivity increases can be spread across 
rises in living standards and increases in the dependency ratio as long as they such 
increases are greater than that of the dependency ratio itself: something which has always 
been the case in the short to medium as well as the long term.  
Yet perhaps more important than these effects, is the lack of any simple relationship 
between dependency and employment status. Young employees may carry heavy burdens 
of training or mortgage debt. The retired may possess substantial assets accumulated across 
the life course. And if we learn the key lesson of not drawing longitudinal conclusions from 
transversal comparisons, we may safely hypothesise that tomorrow’s retirees will have 
accumulated more than today’s. ‘Population ageing’ has, at least, contradictory 
implications for dependency ratios.  
Once again we may take Spain as an example, where calculations taking an appropriately 
longitudinal perspective reveal a very different prospect for dependency ratios than the 
standard gloomy prognoses. Analysing synthetic cohorts constructed from a quarter century 
Labour Force Surveys, Garrido and Chulia estimate dependency ratios in Spain to fall 40% 
between 1985 and 2030 (2005 figure 6.2). Blanes et al (1995), also using longitudinal 
techniques, obtained similar results a decade earlier. Advancing activity rates for women 
and the fall in young dependents more than makes up for the rise in the number of older 
inactive people and later labour market entry. 
Mass maturity and the reproductive revolution have been central to imparting an 
unprecedented dynamism to modern societies by revolutionising their reproductive 
efficiency and emancipating them from the eternal struggle against early death and wasted 
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life. What other social progress bears comparison with the unprecedented prospect of a long 
and healthier life for almost all? A life that is freer in that it stretches well beyond the 
(reduced) obligations of the reproductive years. There is a well known strong statistical 
relationship between a states’ affluence and the life expectancy of its citizens. Affluence 
has been assumed to confer longevity. However the reverse is also important: mass 
longevity facilitates affluence. How can it be, therefore, that such magnificent social 
progress comes to been seen as the social sclerosis summoned up by ‘population ageing’ 
rhetoric? Let us outline of two of our ideas. First such rhetoric is a convenient tool for those 
seeking rationales to restrict the welfare state, on the grounds that such sclerosis threatens 
future prosperity. Second, it comprises an unfortunate legacy from social sciences’ 
flirtation with eugenicist ideas (Mackenzie 1981). From Malthus onwards demography has 
at times been distorted by an unfortunate tendency to see the right kind of early deaths as, 
in the long run, not only inevitable but even desirable. 
 
7.- Demography and the state 
Demography as a discipline has to an extent a certain vested interest in ‘population’ 
‘problems’ that it might hold out the possibility of understanding and solving. These 
‘problems’ are those of the state. For example states looking for sufficient conscripts for 
their armies, or contributors to their tax or social security systems, or concerned to gauge 
the demand for their health or education services. It is no accident, for example, that the 
British Census had its roots in the Revolutionary War with France (the British Government 
wished to know how many men of fighting age it might have at its disposal) (Colley 1994), 
nor that demographers happily conceive of ‘populations’ in terms of the physical 
boundaries of states and legal definitions of citizenship. States have routinely feared 
population decline as leading in the short or long term to the erosion of their power 
(Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). And demographers have frequently solemnly clothed such 
fears with scientific respectability. They have done much the same with complementary 
fears of an ‘alien’ population ‘explosion’ and the consequent impoverishment of the 
developing world: impoverishment that might, in the era of the cold war, nourish the 
growth of communism. But just as the dire predictions of population and national collapse 
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in Europe in the 1930s and population and communist explosion in the South in the 1970s 
and 1980s proved mistaken, we should treat current predictions of dire European 
population decline with appropriate caution.  
Let us make only three observations. First, the future of life expectancy increases is 
uncertain. While some argue that we are now approaching a biological limit such that the 
rate of future increases will progressively diminish (Olshansky, Carnes and Cassel 1990) 
others argue that such a limit is far from obvious (Wilmoth 1997; Wilmoth et al. 2000). 
However, as long as they continue, the ‘replacement level’ for fertility can lie below the 
oft-cited figure of 2.1 children per woman. This is graphically illustrated for Spain in 
Figure 3, which shows the difference between conventional reproduction measures and one 
based on Henry (1965), that is, the proportion of ‘person years’ being replaced.  
 
 
Figure 3.- Evolution of gross and net reproduction rates, and reproduction of years of life. 
Spain by generation 1871-1950 
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Second, any problem of population ‘decline’ is a purely political one in the context of a 
planet whose population has almost trebled in the last half century. It is about state rather 
than personal potency. Third, ‘population ageing’ is curious way to label one of the greatest 
modern accomplishments of mankind: the ‘democratisation’ of the chances of enjoying a 
long, and lengthening lifespan, together with a reduction in the proportion of that span 
dedicated to reproductive labour, and especially ‘wasted’ reproductive labour: an anodyne 
phrase for what it represents – the emancipation of the vast majority of people either from 
their own early death or the trauma of witnessing the death of their child. Compared to the 
ugly fate of those ‘populations’ condemned to live in states still blighted by war, famine, 
disease and high child mortality, a fate all the more dreadful because readily avoidable, 
‘population ageing’ is an achievement to be heartily wished for. 
 
8.- The transversal, the longitudinal and the demographic transition 
Understanding the reproductive revolution requires us to understand not only the distinction 
between transversal and longitudinal approaches to measuring fertility (as in the 
comparison of period total fertility rates and cohort completed fertility rates) but also the 
distinction between ‘fertility’ and reproduction. Fertility is often taken directly as an 
indicator of reproduction (for example in the debate over fertility decline and population 
ageing or stagnation). However to consider reproduction actually requires us to examine the 
generational relation between both its components: fertility and mortality. This allows us to 
be both more cautious about the likelihood of imminent population decline, and also less 
certain about whether such population decline, should it ever occur, is something to be 
feared. ‘Population’ reductions might pose policy challenges to particular states, and alter 
the coefficients of their global power base. They pose no conceivable threat whatsoever to 
the reproduction of the species. Such a conclusion turns on the misuse of the term 
‘population’ if transplanted too directly from biology to demography. Species may have 
populations. The earth has a human population. States have inventories of citizens, 
residents, those present within the territory who are not resident (a category significantly 
lacking from the standard terminology) and so on. To refer to such inventories as a 
‘population’ is to apply a naturalistic term to what is a thoroughly social construct, 
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determined by the extent to which states are able to monopolise control of territory, define 
citizenship or nationality, control migration and so on. This application is facilitated by a 
sociological imagination that substitutes the transversal for the longitudinal.  
Let us conclude with some methodological and theoretical observations and reflections. 
The first concerns the disciplinary division of labour between sociology and demography. It 
is only because the links between these two disciplines have recently been so weak that the 
kinds of gaps in knowledge and distorted conceptualisations that we have discussed above 
can come about. Sociology ought to pay more attention to ‘reproduction’ in the sense of the 
supply of mortal human beings as well as to the reproduction of social ‘structures’ such 
beings might fill. Demography ought to pay more attention not only to the social relations 
within which the variables it tries to understand develop, but also to the constellations of 
state power within which it has developed as a discipline (Hodgson 1983; MacInnes 2003).  
The second concerns the relationship between the transversal and the longitudinal in any 
research that involves age as a variable. Demography has been developing the 
methodological and theoretical implications of such a distinction for decades. Sociology 
would do well to take this up (Lèvy 1993; Riley 1997).  
Insofar as it has led to a world in which people have a more limited direct experience of the 
death of relatives or others they know personally and in which such experience occurs later 
in life, the reproductive revolution has helped contribute to the elaboration of a specifically 
transversal ‘sociological imagination’ of societies, imagined as ‘flat’ self-reproducing 
structures which move through time, and in which the question of which particular 
individuals comprise a given population is for practical purposes irrelevant. Private trouble, 
to use Mills’ formulation, is simply the microcosm of public issue. Thus, for example, the 
population of Spain in 2004 can be compared with that of 1994 or 1904, as if it were a 
matter of comparing something with a common element: Spanish society in 2004 with 
Spanish society in 1994. The sociological imagination effortlessly (and, we suspect, largely 
unconsciously) transforms longitudinal flows into transversal stocks. Thus, e.g. we might 
observe that population has ‘grown’ by x thousand, or that the working class has grown 
smaller or that a greater proportion of fathers are changing nappies and so on. Were we to 
assume that social self reproduction were perfect, that ‘Spain’ in its 2004 edition was 
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essentially similar to ‘Spain’ in its 1994 (or for that matter 1904) edition, and that 
individuals were either immortal or entirely socially constructed, then this would not 
matter, because we would simply be measuring the ‘same’ social units at different points in 
time. It would not matter if we used (for example) the experience of those who are 
currently ‘middle aged’ in a cross sectional survey to represent either the future experience 
of the young or past experience of the old, or represent the life course as the progression 
from the experience of the currently young to the currently old. But since the raison d’être 
of sociology is precisely the need to understand the ‘constant revolutionising’ of modern 
society, this is an unhelpful, if not self-defeating assumption.  
This is not just because the confusion of the transversal and longitudinal yields empirically 
misleading results, although it certainly does do that. For example the total fertility rate, 
much cited in debates about population decline and population ageing, routinely 
overestimates fertility decline in contemporary Europe because it assumes (as any 
transversal measure must to) that the best estimate of the behaviour of a given age group in 
the future is the repetition of the current behaviour of those of that age. It is because this 
confusion makes a simplifying assumption about the nature of social relations that is at 
once analytically crippling and politically convenient.  
Social relations are promiscuous across both time and space. Writing, and later mechanical 
reproduction, allow the long dead to communicate with the yet to be born. Our descendants 
will still be able to read the works of Plato. Everywhere. However for practical purposes it 
is often impossible to think of ‘society’ in terms of the global historical existence and 
evolution over time of civilization, or of ‘history’ as the manifold imaginings of the nature 
key aspects of the past must have assumed in order to give rise to social relations as we 
know them now. It has therefore been easier to think in terms of ‘societies’ with relatively 
discrete histories and diverse contemporary structures. It has been easier still to align the 
spatial boundaries of these societies with the contemporary states. Population 
metamorphoses into states’ populations. 
The demographic transition is based on transversal measures, while the concept of a 
reproductive revolution adopts a consistently longitudinal perspective, based on 
generational demographic indicators. This is decisive. In the demographic transition, 
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mortality and fertility are not ‘real’ in the sense of phenomena actually experienced by any 
actual group of people, and take account neither of the passage of time in the life course nor 
the effects of changing mortality levels on peoples’ actual lives. ‘Reproduction’ is the 
reproduction of ‘stocks’ as it were, rather than the reproduction of lives. That is why the 
issue of whether mortality falls produce lower fertility, and if so, what are the mechanisms 
which link the two phenomena remain unresolved. The demographic transition takes the 
form of an empirical generalization rather than a theory in the proper methodological sense 
of the term, because the transversal measures it uses cannot go beyond this. In fact, it has 
been shown that mortality declines do not always precede fertility falls, as happened for 
example in Catalonia. It does not establish causal mechanisms that demonstrate how 
mortality falls produce a demographic transition. On the contrary, the concept of the 
reproductive revolution is a ‘theory’ in that it specifies causal mechanisms and directions. 
The demographic transition account is ‘exogenous’ to demography and depends upon 
rather general concepts of development and modernization. However the concept of a 
reproductive revolution can be developed within demographic terms that are themselves 
quantifiable.  
Individuals may aspire to ubiquity, but find their lives anchored in a material body confined 
to only one place at any one time and limited, even after the reproductive revolution, to a 
lifespan that may be of unknowable duration but is definitely finite. Their sense of self, 
identity or agency resides in their ability to think of their lives in terms of a biography over 
which they have determination, but not control. In a disenchanted era, they may discard a 
view of their lives in terms of fate, calling, God’s will or the push and pull of nature or 
super-nature, and seek instead to understand it in terms of the collision of their individual 
agency with the legacy of history and agency of others. This is, of course, a Herculean task. 
Little wander that Weber could use such terms as ‘unprecedented inner loneliness’ (Weber 
1930) to describe the soul of those with ‘no choice but to choose’ (Weeks 1995). Moreover, 
that same Enlightenment and rise of scientific rationalization that dethroned God also 
demanded (in theory if not in practice) that men and women henceforth make history in a 
way that respected each other’s agency, forcing social order to contend with liberty. One 
way to simplify this task has been to appeal to the old bases of order and structure: nature 
and faith. These may be and remain surprisingly effective strategies, but in the longer term 
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run up against the problem that since the will of God or nature rests upon human 
interpretation, they merely project the making of a choice onto others.  
Another way to simplify this task has been the sociological imagination. Perhaps in the 
absence of Divine or Natural laws, men and women might discover ‘social’ laws to guide 
their understanding of social action and consequence. But this imagination can actually 
obscure the processes of social change if it is exercised in too simple a form, giving us over 
socialized conceptions of people (Wrong 1961) whose life courses are read off from 
transversal data or ‘snapshots’ at a given point in time of what is imagined to be social 
structure. Thus a major challenge posed to sociology in understanding the reproductive 
revolution is to develop ways of imagining or theorizing society that enable us to see the 
longitudinal more clearly, and see the construction of the social through the prism of the 
development over time of biographies, constructing the transversal from the longitudinal, 
rather than vice versa. 
 
9.- Conclusions 
This article has suggested a new concept for understanding the nature of demographic 
change in modern societies, arguing that adopting a longitudinal rather than transversal 
perspective reveals the existence of a one-off change in the efficiency of the reproductive 
system (considered in its simplest form as the relation of the number of births per woman to 
population level) which has been fundamental to the rise of modernity. It has argued that 
recognising this has profound implications for how we view such issues as declining 
fertility, population ageing, the evolution of the family, the role of the state, gender change 
and the distribution of work (both productive and reproductive, paid and unpaid) across the 
life course and between men and women. We believe it also has an important role to play in 
many other debates, such as progressive deregulation of sexuality (including the 
legalisation of homosexual marriage); the sociology of age and the life course; the 
evolution of the intergenerational transfer of wealth and other forms of capital (and the 
competition between the state and the family to control it); the economics of time and that 
whole tradition of sociology that seeks to establish links between modernisation, broadly 
conceived, secularisation and changing values. If we think in terms of the ‘quality’ as well 
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as ‘quantity’ of children, then the evolution of the reproductive revolution is central to 
states’ concerns to improve competitiveness in a globalising, knowledge-based economy. It 
also has methodological and theoretical implications for both sociology and demography. 
Rather than repeat the specific conclusions in each of these areas reported above, let us try 
to reflect briefly on two considerations with wider significance. 
Because of its concern with vital statistics, demography has always had a commitment to 
longitudinal techniques, whose simplest form is, after all, the life table. This is a 
commitment sociology would do well to embrace. It is, after all, a central irony that a 
science which sets out to explain and understand social change, should use transversal 
techniques whose capacity to say anything about the life course is predicated precisely on 
the absence of such change! Longitudinal approaches can be cumbersome and costly, but 
technical innovation has brought them within much easier reach than only a few years ago.  
Enduring revolutions are about change that is not only rapid but popular, not only because 
it affects the mass of the population, but because they themselves are its protagonists. So it 
has been with the reproductive revolution. Like all truly fundamental historical revolutions 
it has had no leader, but rather been driven forward by a range of discrete activities by 
countless anonymous social actors. No Robespierre or Lenin has inspired or led it. No 
manifesto has proclaimed its aims. No armies have fought under its banner. What has 
happened rather, is that the mass of ordinary people, in the course of their everyday 
activities have found ways to emancipate themselves from the demographic straitjacket of 
the past, discovering in turn, that such emancipation opens up for them hitherto unimagined 
freedom of manoeuvre in their lives, including the freedom to devote more time and 
resources to the rearing of their children within a much longer lifespan, or, alternatively, the 
freedom to delay becoming a parent till an age they would in earlier centuries have been 
lucky to survive to, or again to avoid becoming a parent at all. Not only has this process 
included a virtuous temporal circle, in which increased reproductive efficiency quickly 
released the potential to develop it still further in succeeding generations, it has, thanks to 
migration, trade and communications, exploded globally. Should the developed world 
contemplate the continued waste of life and toll of early deaths taken by the failure to 
complete the reproductive revolution in countries of the South ravaged by poverty and 
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disease, then in ages to come, people will have every reason to judge the 21st century 
harshly. 
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